103 To relinquish, that’s right, to moderate. One day, a great Italian banker told me we should draw the line at enough profit. Now Pirni tells me something similar, at the level of soil and resource consumption. However, the crux of the matter hinges on who gets to quantify this elusive "enough". That seems to me the real issue. This pivotal aspect could very well be, at some point, the defining or denying factor in shaping the scope of action – hence, to use an ugly word, of “power”. «The ideas might be here, indeed they are, and it must also be said that our country has often been in the vanguard for their production, for knowing how to launch them, how to be good or innovative in imagining the future from diverse angles. The challenge doesn't merely revolve around cultivating the notion of savings or non-consumption concerning what we currently possess, but it extends to imagining alternatives beyond what we lack. In addressing the concept of Enough, actually, in order to put this at ease – even if it may seem a cheap or partisan joke for the philosophers – I would say that perhaps we should go back to the classics and, alongside reading Plato, we should delve into Book V of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, a seminal text that delineates the Theory of Equity, which makes a further step with respect to the profiles mentioned earlier. How can one be equitable? Aristotle says that equity is the perfecting of justice. But then, how can one be more perfect than justice? If one’s justice is already balancing – you have been wronged, it is returned to you; you have great merit, it is recognized – what could be more perfect than that? Well, in my opinion, and this is how I have tried to portray it, the idea of equity is that of a great theoretical machine for dismantling what I call intergenerational indifference». «But let’s still stick with Enough: let’s imagine that equity is something with respect to which I would have a legal entitlement. That is: let’s imagine that we, together with our children, are all around a table, we have an excellent cake and we start dividing the slices. Probably, being two adults, you and I would be entitled to an extra slice, maybe a bigger one. And yet we decide that even though we are entitled to it, we forego. Despite having that extra chance of development, we renounce. Even though we have that possibility of further gain, we give up. Why? Because, in giving it up, we are making those resources, those goods, those chances of gain and development available for someone else. We are giving up space to give it to someone else, but we are not losing anything, because you and I were already satiated with one slice of cake. We would have been entitled to two, but that would not have given us an additional sense of satiety. There is no profile of further satiety that can give us greater satisfaction, only a sense of over-fullness that is overabundance of the useless, that beyond-Enough that we can no longer afford. Rereading Aristotle then – but perhaps also the medievals, and perhaps the contemporaries too». Yet, the pivotal question that arises in me as I contemplate Pirni's clear reasoning delves more into the primal, darker dimension of human nature. Why should I care about others when I already possess everything I need, and why should I relinquish something for the benefit of individuals who have not yet even come into existence? «I've traversed through an argument against intergenerational indifference. How does this device work? It is rooted in the perception of indifference as generally devoid of positive qualities. While the psychological and moral facets that drive indifference are much more complex, there is also a good indifference, which is the one giving rise to human subjectivity. I am indifferent to those around me, largely because this indifference is a prerequisite for shaping my personal identity, comprehending who am I, and who I aspire to become. This form of indifference, which is an intrinsic part of self-discovery, is not the target of criticism, but rather it is the one manifested as a steadfast neglect of the needs of others, a phenomenon brimming with moral implications. One thing is if you are indifferent towards someone who rings your doorbell tonight asking you for help; but the issue, when indifference is discharged intergenerationally, engenders a massive possibility of moral discounting. Who might harbor a sense of culpability for failing to assist someone they neither know nor will ever? I experience guilt if I decline to aid the individuals who seek help as they enter this threshold at this very moment. Yet, how can I bear a sense of guilt for neglecting to aid the person who will cross this threshold asking for help from someone who will be here in two decades?». «Perhaps we should reassess from this standpoint – and it would be good if, for instance, the banking system also embarked on this journey – the very idea of a banking institution originating from bond law. It is called institution of solidarity. The notion to entertain is that this institution carries forth a bond law wherein I, you or another party decide to buy something, and in doing so, not only we shoulder a portion of the cost, but each of us undertakes the commitment to pay even if someone among us can no longer afford it, thus entering into a solidarity that essentially equates to economic solidity: we are solid enough to be able to absorb the non-payer. Now, on an intergenerational scale, let’s envision how to ensure this solidarity for those who are not yet here. Primarily, by leaving as little debt as we can – because we are aware that they will have to pay it for us. We are, therefore, accountable for their payment, avoiding overspending on our part. This model works for the younger generations, but it is equally applicable to the silver economy, that of the silver generations, those
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