104 who are progressing toward a more advanced age and transitioning away from the most productive phase of life. Nevertheless, this should not lead us to deviate from a framework of inter- and transgenerational reciprocity. In essence, intergenerationality extends not only to future generations but also to those alongside and behind us, viewed through the lens of generativity». Now I can discern, with a certain curiosity, that we are clearly talking about moral philosophy. «Perhaps we need to give greater prominence to this intricate word, morale, a term oftentimes mishandled and misconstrued. Much rhetoric has been lavished upon morale, yet avenues exist for reinstating it at the heart of the discourse, untethered from slogans about family/non-family. I think it is crucial to go back to the origins of those who thought of philosophy as an undertaking for the polis. Plato, in particular, envisioned philosophy as for the city, thinking of it exactly as politics – remembering that the etymological root of politics is indeed “polis”, city, i.e. the co-extension of what was the legal space of that era. That epoch represents a germinative moment wherein we can find in a fertile crucible both morale, politics, and the germinal concept of justice». «And now, from this perspective, what can we find? I believe we can find a trove of renewed prospects to reposition morale at the forefront. I teach Moral Philosophy. And the first thing I say to my students when I enter the classroom is: “Ladies and gentlemen, we convene here to talk about moral philosophy, but I don’t think that moral philosophy will help us to become good girls and good boys. We are not interested in doing goodism à la carte or in the form of pamphlets that we disseminate, bind, and then relegate to our most cherished bookshelves, their content left dormant upon completion. No, moral philosophy serves the loftier purpose of honing our capacity for cogent argumentation – that is, to do something steeped in the annals of antiquity, yet tremendously contemporary and at every instance problematic: it furnishes us with the tools for articulating rationales and motivations underlying our actions, our doing or our avoidance of doing”». «Consequently, moral philosophy can be reasserted at the epicenter by giving it back the space it always had in antiquity: that of the public discourse, i.e. open to everyone and available to confront every opinion while adhering to an overarching tenet: we have the duty to be authentic and honest arguers. A deficiency in this regard engenders poor argumentation. If I am right, you must be able to tell me so; if you are right, I must be able to agree that you have given me a better reason than mine. If, after an argumentation, we leave each other saying “This is your opinion, I have another one”, but you have not been able to prove its merits to me, well, you are a bad arguer, because although I have proved to you the validity of mine and the lesser goodness of yours, you have not been able to admit that yours should be abandoned. But we are sons and grandsons of people who have not been able to admit they were wrong. We should start seriously thinking about it, getting familiar with it. A concurrent impediment in dialogue materializes in the juxtaposition of individuals who are either unable to concede their own fallibility or reluctant to abandon their moral comfort zone. We say: “I have always believed in this, this is how it is done here and how it has always been done, why should we change?”. This phenomenon is also palpable in domains such as climate, environment, and sustainability. For example, when the idea of separate waste collection was introduced, questions arise such as: “Why should I venture beyond my comfort zone?”, 'Why do we have to do it, while the others don’t?”, “If everyone embraced this practice, I too would partake in it”. This phenomenon, termed the principle of individual causal inefficacy in moral philosophy, constitutes a vortex-like quagmire that gives rise to profiles of inaction, that is the inability to keep our motivation straight and taut with respect to the outcome of sustainability or contribution, even minimal, to change. This constitutes the other facet under examination, what I call the motivational gap, the breakdown of motivational tightness». Nevertheless, no choice or decision is impervious to the perils of tension, no matter whether they are conflicts like rich versus rich or poor versus poor… «The potential conflict between generations, classes or social needs indeed represents an issue, and we have to profoundly think about this match between conflict and potential, in relation to the issue of savings and to regress in terms of natural resource consumption. This quagmire underscores what may be characterized as the cost of sustainability – or the short-circuit of sustainability and accountability. It underscores the peril that resides in the oft-repeated refrain “It’s always someone else's turn”, what in moral or political philosophy is called the us/them conflict or the me/you conflict. Why should we, the younger generation, be obligated to economize when they, our predecessors, have depleted all they could? Our collective conviction has traditionally held that ethics constitutes a vestige of the past, yet in reality ethics pertains to the future, a notion reinvigorated by the considerations delineated above. This dynamic engenders an intergenerational schism that divides the old from the young, the wealthy from the indigent. One must grapple with the acknowledgment that the ecological transition imposes expenses that have the potential to further segregate, demarcating those who can afford the transition from those who cannot. Those who can afford to switch to Euro 5, Euro 6, Euro 8, or electric vehicles and those who
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